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The Hughes Court Docket Books:
The Early Terms, 1929-1933

BARRY CUSHMAN

For many years, the docket books kept by
a number of the Hughes Court Justices have
been held by the Ofﬁce of the Curator of
the Supreme Court. Yet the existence of these
docket books was not widely known, and
access to them was highly restricted. In April
of 2014, however, the Court adopted new
guidelines designed to increase access to
the docket books for researchers. This article
offers a report and analysis based on a review
of all of the docket books that the Curator’s
Ofﬁce holds for the early Hughes Court,
comprising the 1929-1933 Terms. Only one
of the entries in these docket books has been
examined and reported on before.1
This article canvasses the available
docket book entries relevant to what scholars
commonly regard as the major decisions of
the early Hughes Court.2 This review includes ﬁfty-nine cases concerning areas of
law as diverse as the Commerce Clause, the
dormant Commerce Clause, substantive due
process, equal protection, fair trade, labor
relations, intergovernmental tax immunities,
criminal procedure, civil rights, and civil

liberties. The information in the docket books
sheds particularly fascinating new light on
decisions such as Nebbia v. New York,3 Home
Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell,4 New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann,5 Powell v. Alabama,6
Nixon v. Condon,7 and Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co.8 In addition, for these and the
many other cases examined, this article
also reports on whether a unanimous decision
was also free from dissent at conference or
became so only because one or more Justices
acquiesced in the judgment of their
colleagues, as well as on whether nonunanimous decisions were divided by the
same vote and with the same alliances at
conference. The docket books also provide
records of instances in which a case that
initially was assigned to one Justice was later
reassigned to another. These records afford us
some insight into the kinds of cases in which
this tended to occur, and provide an opportunity to document for the ﬁrst time the long
held suspicion that the notoriously slowwriting Justice Van Devanter frequently was
relieved of his opinions by the Chief Justice.
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By examining the docket books for the early Hughes Court (pictured in 1930), comprising the 1929-1933
Terms, the author was able to report whether a unanimous decision was also free from dissent at conference or
became so only because one or more Justices acquiesced in the judgment of their colleagues, as well as on
whether non-unanimous decisions were divided by the same vote and with the same alliances at conference.
The docket books also provide records of instances in which a case that initially was assigned to one Justice was
later reassigned to another.

A review of the early Hughes Court
docket books also makes possible two
contributions to the political science literature
on judicial behavior. The ﬁrst is to the
scholarship on vote ﬂuidity and unanimity
norms in the Supreme Court. It is widely
agreed that the period from the Chief
Justiceship of John Marshall through that
of Charles Evans Hughes was characterized
by a “norm of consensus,” “marked by
individual justices accepting the Court’s
majority opinions.”9 It is generally believed
that this norm of consensus collapsed early in
the Chief Justiceship of Harlan Fiske Stone,10
though some scholars have pointed to causes
that antedate Stone’s elevation to the center
chair.11 Still others have suggested that there
may have been “an earlier, more gradual
change in norms” on the late Taft and Hughes
Courts.12 Political scientists who have had
access to the docket books of various Justices
serving on other Courts have demonstrated

that much of the consensus achieved by the
Court throughout its history has resulted from
the decision of Justices who had dissented
at conference to join the majority’s ultimate
disposition. A substantial body of literature
shows that Justices commonly have changed
their votes between the conference and the
ﬁnal vote on the merits.13
Of the different types of vote ﬂuidity
between the conference vote and the ﬁnal
vote on the merits in major early Hughes
Court cases, by far the most common was for
a Justice to move from a dissenting or passing
vote to a vote with the ultimate majority. An
examination of the docket books permits us to
illuminate several features of this phenomenon: the major cases in which it occurred,
how frequently it occurred in major cases,
the frequency with which each of the Justices
did so, and the comparative success of
early Hughes Court Justices in preparing
majority opinions that would either enlarge

HUGHES COURT DOCKET BOOKS
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The Justices have traditionally used special docket books to record votes and take notes on case deliberations
in Conference. Bound red-leather books embossed in gold with a hefty locket, such as this one belonging to
Pierce Butler, came into use in the 1870s and were issued by the Government Printing Ofﬁce until the 1940s.

the size of the ultimate winning coalition or
produce ultimate unanimity from a divided
conference.
The second contribution concerns the
behavior of newcomers to the Court. In 1958,
Eloise C. Snyder published an article in which
she concluded that new members of the Court
tended initially to afﬁliate with a moderate,

“pivotal clique” before migrating to a more
clearly ideological liberal or conservative
bloc.14 Seven years later, J. Woodford
Howard argued that Justice Frank Murphy’s
ﬁrst three Terms on the Court were marked
by a “freshman effect” characterized by an
“instability” in his decision making that
rendered the Justice “difﬁdent to the point
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of indecisiveness.”15 These studies in turn
spawned a literature on the “freshman” or
“acclimation” effect for Justices new to the
Court. These studies generally characterize
the freshman effect “as consisting of one
or more of the following types of behavior:
(1) initial bewilderment or disorientation,
(2) assignment of a lower than average
number of opinions to the new justices, and
(3) an initial tendency on the part of the
new justice to join a moderate block of
justices.”16 While some studies have conﬁrmed the existence of some feature or
another of the freshman effect,17 others
have cast signiﬁcant doubt on the hypothesis,
maintaining that it is either non-existent or
conﬁned to limited circumstances.18 Studies
of the freshman period for individual Justices
on the whole have not lent much support to
the hypothesis.19
Professor Howard suggested that the
freshman effect might also be manifested
by a tendency of new Justices to change their
votes between the conference vote and the
ﬁnal vote on the merits. Howard listed a
number of considerations that might prompt
a Justice to shift ground in this manner, but
ﬁrst among them were “unstable attitudes
that seem to have resulted from the process of
assimilation to the Court.” For instance, he
remarked, “Justice Cardozo, according to one
clerk’s recollection of the docket books . . .
frequently vot[ed] alone in conference before
ultimately submerging himself in a group
opinion.”20 Howard reported that Justice
Murphy exhibited “a similar instability”
during his freshman years on the Court.21
Subsequent studies from the Vinson, Warren,
and Burger Court docket books have produced divergent conclusions with respect to
this reputed feature of the freshman effect.22
The only freshman Justices on the early
Hughes Court were Owen J. Roberts,
appointed in 1930, and Benjamin N. Cardozo,
appointed in 1932.23 A review of the voting
behavior of these newcomers to the Court
does not disclose any appreciable freshman

effect with respect to voting ﬂuidity. Instead,
one ﬁnds that, in the major cases examined
here, these two Justices were among the least
likely to change their positions between
the conference vote and the ﬁnal vote on
the merits.

The Early Hughes Court Justices and
Their Docket Books
The early Hughes Court was a remarkably stable Court. After Hughes was conﬁrmed to the center chair on February 13,
1930,24 and three months later Roberts was
conﬁrmed to the seat vacated by the untimely
death of Edward Terry Sanford,25 the Court
saw only one personnel change over the next
seven years. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
retired on January 12, 1932,26 and Cardozo
was conﬁrmed as his successor on March 2 of
that year.27 Hughes, Roberts, and Cardozo
joined six holdovers from the Taft Court:
Justices Van Devanter, James Clark McReynolds, Louis D. Brandeis, George Sutherland,
Pierce Butler, and Stone. This was the Court
that would encounter the legislative and
regulatory responses to the ravages of the
Great Depression.
The Ofﬁce of the Curator has in its
collection the docket books of ﬁve of the early
Hughes Court Justices. Unfortunately, the
docket books of Chief Justice Hughes and
Justices Holmes and Sutherland do not appear
to have survived. During this period Justice
McReynolds burned his docket books at
the conclusion of each Term,28 and Paul
Freund, who clerked for Justice Brandeis
during the 1932 Term, reports that his Justice
did the same.29 But the collection does have
a complete run of the docket books of
Justice Stone, from the 1929 through the
1933 Terms. The Stone docket books contain
records of the conference votes in most cases,
and occasionally some notes on the remarks
made by colleagues during conference discussions. Unfortunately, Stone’s handwriting
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is very difﬁcult to decipher, so the content of
these notes too often remains obscure. The
collection also has nearly a complete run of
the docket books for Justice Roberts, including the 1930-1933 Terms. The Roberts
docket books similarly contain records of
the conference votes in most cases, along with
an occasional but none-too-frequent note on
conference discussions.
The Curator’s collection likewise contains a nearly complete run of Pierce Butler’s
docket books, including the 1931-1933
Terms. Unfortunately, the Butler docket
book for the 1930 Term does not appear to
have survived. Butler’s docket books provide
not only a record of conference votes, but also
a remarkably rich set of notes on conference
discussions. The collection contains as well
Justice Cardozo’s docket book for the 1932
Term, which has records of some conference
votes but no signiﬁcant notes on conference
discussion. Finally, the collection holds
Van Devanter’s docket books for the 1931
and 1933 Terms. Though these docket books
contain entries for most of the cases decided
by the Court during those terms, they contain
no records of conference votes or conference
discussion. As a consequence, they are of
little use to the historical researcher.30
In discussing the post-conference voting
behaviors of the early Hughes Court Justices,
I will be using several deﬁned terms. I shall
use the term acquiescence to denote instances
in which a Justice who either dissented or
passed at conference ultimately joined in the
majority’s disposition.31 In other words,
acquiescence denotes instances in which a
Justice who was not with the majority at
conference moved toward the majority. I will
refer to movements from dissent at conference to the majority in the ﬁnal vote on the
merits32 as instances of strong acquiescence,
and to movements from a passing vote at
conference to the majority in the ﬁnal vote on
the merits as instances of weak acquiescence.33 Of course, such movement might
have occurred either because the Justice in

107

question became persuaded that the majority
was correct, or because, though remaining
unpersuaded, he elected to go along with the
majority for the sake of some other consideration such as collegiality or public perception.34 The information contained in the
docket books does not enable us to discriminate between these two possibilities, and
therefore I shall not attempt to do so here. I
will use the term non-acquiescence to denote
instances in which a Justice who dissented at
conference remained steadfast in his opposition to the majority’s disposition. In cases of
non-acquiescence, there was no post-conference change in the vote of the Justice in
question. I will use the term quasi-acquiescence to denote a situation in which a Justice
who was inclined in conference to oppose the
majority’s disposition withheld his dissent
and instead publicly concurred in the result
with the written statement that he was doing
so only because he felt bound by the authority
of an earlier decision with which he disagreed. Finally, I will use the term defection
to denote instances in which a Justice who
was either a member of the conference
majority or passed at conference later
dissented from the published opinion.35 In
other words, defection denotes instances in
which the Justice in question moved away
from the majority. Again, I will refer to
movements from the majority at conference
to dissent in the ﬁnal vote on the merits as
instances of strong defection, and to movements from a passing vote at conference to the
majority in the ﬁnal vote on the merits as
instances of weak defection.36

The Cases
Unanimous Decisions with No Vote
Changes
There were several cases from the early
Terms of the Hughes Court in which the
Justices unanimously upheld state exercises
of the police power or the taxing power in the
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face of challenges under the Fourteenth
Amendment and/or the dormant Commerce
Clause. The vote in each of these cases was
also unanimous at conference.37 For instance,
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton38 upheld a state tax
on butter substitutes. Hughes opened the
conference discussion of Magnano by saying,
“Would have to be a very strong case to hold
tax invalid as excessive.” Butler records that
Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Brandeis
agreed with the Chief Justice. McReynolds
apparently mentioned McCray v. United
States, a 1904 decision that had upheld a
steep federal excise tax on oleomargarine
colored to resemble butter. At this point Van
Devanter interjected that “fed & state taxes
not on same plane.”39
Several cases contributed to the line of
authority distinguishing production from
commerce in both afﬁrmative and dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and would
soon be relied upon by the Court in a major
New Deal decision limiting federal regulatory authority.40 In Utah Power & Light Co. v.
Pfost,41 for example, the Court unanimously
upheld a state tax on the production of
electricity to be transmitted outside the state
of production, despite the fact that interstate
and intrastate generation were inseparable.
Butler records Hughes characterizing the
measure as an “Occupation tax,” and noting
that “There is an intra[state] activity.”42
The ﬂip side of this local/national
distinction, of course, was that Congress
enjoyed signiﬁcant authority to regulate the
interstate activities of common carriers.
Three railway regulation cases decided by
unanimous conference vote illustrate this
principle. In Texas & New Orleans Railway
Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks,43 the
Court unanimously upheld the self-organization provisions of the Railway Labor Act of
1926. And in two decisions applying the
doctrine of the Shreveport Rate Case,44 the
Court unanimously upheld the power of the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to
raise intrastate rates for rail shipment in order

to prevent discrimination against interstate
commerce.45
Another major question of structural
constitutional law also produced unanimity.
In Monaco v. Mississippi,46 the Court
unanimously held that it had no jurisdiction
over a suit brought by a foreign sovereign
against a state of the United States without
that state’s consent. The suit was to recover
principal and interest on government securities that had been issued in the 1830s, and
had matured between 1850 and 1866.47 At the
conference, Hughes observed that there was
no statute of limitation governing the claim.
He noted, “This is ﬁrst case brought by
foreign,” and encouraged his colleagues to
“lay down the proposition that no foreign can
sue one of our states without its consent.”48
There was some disagreement among those
in the majority concerning the proper rationale for the decision. Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler favored resting the decision
on “laches,” maintaining that Monaco was
presenting a “stale claim.”49 Hughes agreed
that “as to laches in much trouble” but
preferred to use the opinion to clarify the
broader jurisdictional issue.50 Brandeis, Roberts, and Cardozo agreed with the comments
of the Chief Justice,51 and, though Stone did
not record the rationale for his own vote,
Butler and Roberts record him as concurring
with the views expressed by Hughes.52 The
Chief’s theory of the case found expression in
his opinion for the Court, which contains no
reference to the doctrine of laches.
There also were a number of cases
concerning criminal law and criminal procedure in which the votes both at conference
and in the published opinion were unanimous.53 For example, Nathanson v. United
States54 invalidated a warrant to search a
private dwelling for liquor on the ground that
it had been issued based on mere belief and
suspicion rather than upon probable cause,
while Quercia v. United States55 overturned a
narcotics conviction where the trial judge’s
charge to the jury had expressed the view that
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the accused’s testimony consisted almost
entirely of perjury.
Finally, all of the Justices agreed in
Cochran v. Board of Education56 that taxation to support provision of non-sectarian
school books to children attending parochial
schools did not constitute a taking of private
property for a private purpose in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Unanimous Decisions with Vote Changes
The Justices of the early Hughes Court
also often managed to produce a united public
front even where they had been divided in
conference. In four cases involving state
regulatory power, a Justice who had disagreed or passed at the conference vote
ultimately joined the opinion of the Court. In
Smith v. Cahoon,57 the Court unanimously
reversed a judgment upholding a statute
requiring private carriers for hire to obtain
certiﬁcates of necessity in order to use public
highways. At the conference, however,
McReynolds passed, and Stone recorded the
disposition as “Tentative.”58 Minnesota v.
Blasius59 unanimously upheld that state’s
taxation of cattle bought in another state and
held brieﬂy before resale, but at conference
Sutherland was not with the majority. Though
P.F. Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan60 unanimously upheld a Nebraska statute regulating
bread weights, Stone and Butler record that
Van Devanter passed at the conference vote.
And while W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas61
unanimously invalidated as a violation of the
Contracts Clause a debtor exemption statute
applied retroactively, Stone had passed when
the case was voted on in conference.
Two seminal interpretations of the
Federal Trade Commission Act similarly
managed to elicit acquiescence from a
conference holdout. In Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co.,62 McReynolds, who had passed at conference,
ultimately joined the Court’s opinion holding
that competition may be “unfair” within the
meaning of the Act even if it does not
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constitute actual fraud and even if the
consumer suffers no ﬁnancial injury. McReynolds also joined the unanimous opinion in
Federal Trade Commission v. R.F. Keppel &
Bro.,63 even though he had been the lone
dissenter at conference. There the Court held
that a practice may be “unfair” within the
meaning of the Act even if it does not involve
any fraud or deception, and even though
competitors may maintain their competitive
position by adopting it.
The Justices of the early Hughes Court
also forged a united front despite disagreements in conference in two signiﬁcant
federalism cases. In Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal,64 the Court unanimously held that
revenue from copyrights issued by the federal
government were not exempt from state
taxation under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. At the conference,
however, McReynolds and Sutherland had
voiced contrary views. Those two Justices
also had cast dissenting votes at the conference on United States v. Louisiana,65 which
upheld an ICC order raising intrastate rates,
though Stone recorded a question mark next
to Sutherland’s vote, indicating that Sutherland was uncertain of his position. Brandeis
passed at the conference vote, raising the
prospect of three dissenting votes. Indeed, it
appears that Brandeis was inclined toward the
dissenting views expressed by McReynolds.
Butler’s record indicates “4[Brandeis]¼3
[McReynolds].”66 In the end, however, each
of these three Justices acquiesced in the
judgment of the majority.
The same pattern of acquiescence can be
seen in contemporary cases involving criminal law and criminal procedure. In United
States v. LaFranca,67 a case that ﬁgured
prominently in the recent decision of NFIB v.
Sebelius,68 the Court unanimously construed
a putative “tax” under the Prohibition Act
as not truly a tax but instead a “penalty,”
and held that a civil action to recover such a
“tax” was constitutionally barred by a prior
conviction based upon the same transaction.
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Surprisingly, the notoriously cantankerous and disagreeable Justice James Clark McReynolds (above) was the
Justice who most frequently acquiesced in the majority’s opinion after dissenting or passing at the conference
vote.

At the conference, however, Holmes, Stone,
and probably Brandeis disagreed.69 Patton v.
United States70 conﬁrmed that the jury trial
guaranteed to those accused of crime required
the unanimous verdict of a panel of twelve
jurors, but that this right could be waived by
the defendant. The published decision

registered no dissent, with Holmes, Brandeis,
and Stone concurring in the result. At the
conference, however, Butler had disagreed
with his colleagues.71 And in Alford v. United
States,72 a unanimous Court vigorously
conﬁrmed the right of the accused’s counsel
to attempt to discredit a hostile witness on
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cross-examination. At the conference, however, McReynolds had voted to dismiss the
defendant’s appeal.
McReynolds again passed in conference73 but ultimately made a unanimous
Court in United States v. Lefkowitz. There the
Court reversed a conviction where police,
acting pursuant to an arrest warrant for
violation of the liquor laws, arrested defendants at their place of business and proceeded
to search desks and ﬁling cabinets in the
ofﬁce, and to seize various papers for use
against the defendants at trial. The Justices
held that the papers in question were not in
plain view and that the search of the desks and
cabinets therefore was not a lawful search
incident to arrest.74 It appears that Stone may
also have had doubts about his position in
conference: Butler records a question mark
next to Stone’s vote. A clue to the reasons for
Stone’s ambivalence might be found in the
remarks of McReynolds. Butler records
McReynolds as saying “Murder—Pistol.
Narrow space,” which suggests that he may
have believed that the search of the desks
and cabinets was justiﬁed as a means of
insuring the safety of the ofﬁcers. The other
Justices do not appear to have shared this
hesitation. Butler records Hughes as saying
“Search attending arrest may not be exploratory”; Van Devanter as “Is the same. Papers
from person”; and Brandeis as “Papers even
persons ought to be protected.”75 Finally, the
published decision in Gebardi v. United
States76 was unanimous, with Cardozo concurring in the result, but at the conference
both Cardozo and Brandeis cast dissenting
votes. There the Court reversed the conviction of a man and woman for conspiracy to
violate the Mann Act, which prohibited the
interstate transportation of a woman for an
immoral purpose. The couple admittedly had
taken an interstate journey whose itinerary
included frequent stops for fornication. Yet
the Court held that the transported woman
was capable neither of committing nor of
conspiring to commit any offense under the
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Act. As the man had conspired with no one
else for the forbidden transportation, his
conspiracy conviction had to be vacated as
well. As Hughes put it at conference,
“Woman n.g. [not guilty] of such offense.
She merely consents….No conspiracy.”77
Non-Unanimous Decisions with No Vote
Changes
Some of the most important non-unanimous decisions of the early Hughes Court
were decided with no vote changes between
the conference vote and the ﬁnal vote on the
merits. This was the case in three major cases
upholding state power to regulate economic
matters, in each of which Van Devanter,
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler cast
dissenting votes. The ﬁrst was O’Gorman
& Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,78
which upheld against a Due Process challenge state regulation of the commission rates
charged by agents selling ﬁre insurance
policies. The second was Home Bldg. &
Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell,79 a Contracts Clause
landmark upholding Minnesota’s mortgage
moratorium law as an emergency measure.
Butler’s exasperation with his colleagues
suffuses his account of Hughes’s presentation
to the conference. Virtually every mention
of the term “emergency” is placed in scare
quotes. The native Minnesotan records
Hughes’s statement as marked by “Much
exordium.” Hughes apparently referenced the
“preamble” to the statute, which declared that
the extremely distressed ﬁnancial conditions
in Minnesota had generated a mortgage
foreclosure crisis that constituted a “public
economic emergency”;80 “Holt’s picture,”
presumably a reference to the description
of the ﬁnancial condition of the housing
market provided by Justice Andrew Holt’s
opinion for the Minnesota Supreme Court
upholding the act;81 “Olson’s statement,”
referring to Justice Ingerval Olsen’s concurring opinion in the case, in which he likened
the nationwide and worldwide ﬁnancial
crisis to a natural disaster such as a ﬂood or
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Justice Willis Van Devanter suffered from writer’s block and by the 1931 and 1932 Terms his production had
slowed down to one opinion a year. The docket books show instances when Chief Justice Hughes (right) would
reassign an opinion because Van Devanter (left) couldn’t ﬁnish it. They also reveal other examples of cases
initially assigned to one Justice later being transferred to another.

earthquake;82 “Atty Gen,” referring to Minnesota Attorney General Henry Benson’s
statement of general economic conditions
in the state in his argument before the
Court;83 and “mobs etc,” referring to the
“serious breaches of the peace” in the state
that the Attorney General had mentioned
at oral argument.84 “All” of this, Hughes
declared, “shows ‘Emergency.’ ‘Emergency’
does not create power—no provision can be

suspended by ‘emergency.’” Hughes also
cited the “Manigault case 199 U.S.,” a
reference to the 1905 decision of Manigault
v. Springs,85 which the Chief Justice would
cite in his majority opinion as standing
for the proposition that “[t]he economic
interests of the state may justify the exercise
of its continuing and dominant protective
power notwithstanding interference with
contracts.”86
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The third such case was Nebbia v. New
York,87 which upheld the state’s regulation of
the price of milk and in the process retired
the category of “business affected with a
public interest” from the Court’s due process
jurisprudence. Interestingly, the remarks of
Hughes at the Nebbia conference suggest that
initially he advocated an opinion that would
have been narrower and less sweeping than
the one ultimately produced by Roberts.
Butler records Hughes as remarking “‘Common calling.’ Distinguishing Ice Case—
Wolf Case.”88 The “Ice Case” was the 1932
decision of New State Ice v. Liebmann, in
which a 6-2 Court had invalidated an
Oklahoma statute conditioning issuance of
license to manufacture, sell, or distribute ice
on the applicant’s successful showing that
existing licensed facilities in the community
were inadequate to meet the public’s needs,
on the ground that the ice business was not
“affected with a public interest.”89 The “Wolf
Case” was the 1923 decision in Wolff Packing
v. Kansas Court of Industrial Relations, in
which the Court had held that a meatpacking
concern could not be subjected to a mandatory system of compulsory arbitration of labor
disputes because it was doubtful that it was
“affected with a public interest,” and even
if it was, it was not the sort of business
affected with a public interest that could be
compelled by the state to continue its
operations.90 Hughes continued, “Milk business regulated in NY. ‘listed regulations.’
‘Clear as sunshine.’”91 These remarks suggest that Hughes agreed with New York’s
lawyers that it was not necessary to jettison
the category of businesses “affected with a
public interest” in order to uphold the state’s
scheme of price regulation.92 The New York
statute did not constitute a barrier to entry into
a common calling as the Oklahoma regulation
of the ice business had. And it did not seek
to compel continuity of operations as the
Kansas Industrial Court Act at issue in Wolff
Packing had. It seems that Hughes regarded
the milk business as sufﬁciently “affected
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with a public interest” to support the system
of price regulation to which New York had
subjected it.
A similar pattern can be observed in
several cases involving civil rights and civil
liberties. Consider ﬁrst Powell v. Alabama,93
the famous case involving the trial of the
“Scottsboro Boys,” several young AfricanAmericans charged with raping two white
girls on a train in Alabama.94 There the
Justices held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause entitled indigent
defendants in a capital case to effective,
court-appointed counsel. The trial judge had
appointed the entire local bar rather than a
speciﬁc attorney to represent the defendants,
which resulted in a lawyer from outside the
state with no criminal defense experience in
Alabama representing the defendants. The
majority held that this procedure was plainly
inadequate. The vote both at conference
and in the published decision was 7-2, with
McReynolds and Butler dissenting.95 Butler
records that at the conference Hughes stated,
“(a) ‘Show of force,’” apparently referring to
the large presence of intimidating local
whites at the trial. Butler here interjects in
brackets, apparently capturing his own
thoughts that were not necessarily voiced,
“But did not that make for a ‘fair trial.’ Did
not hold ‘mob domination.’” Here Hughes
continued, “(b) Under circumstances court
failed in its duty in appointing counsel. (c)
Trial a ‘farce’. (d) Need not go equal
protection in respect of negroes on jury.”
Van Devanter spoke next, saying “Not due
process. Does not ﬁnd ‘mob domination’—
went on sole ground of ‘lack of opportunity’
to get counsel of their own choice and
to confer re.” McReynolds said “Not void
trial,” and Brandeis stated, “Agree with V
also with C.J. Absence of negroes on jury
and circumstances.” The last Justice whose
remarks Butler recorded was Sutherland,
who ultimately wrote the majority opinion.
“States generally provide counsel—part
of due process,” Sutherland maintained.
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“To appoint all is a farce. Denial of
counsel.”96
In Sgro v. United States,97 a federal
ofﬁcer had obtained a warrant to search the
premises of the accused for intoxicating
liquors in early July. Under the National
Prohibition Act, such warrants expired ten
days after their issuance. The ofﬁcer did not
search the premises until late July, but before
doing so he returned to the magistrate and had
the warrant re-dated and reissued based upon
the original afﬁdavit. The accused was
convicted based on evidence obtained during
the subsequent search. Over the dissents of
Stone and Cardozo, the Court held that the
warrant had been invalid—once the original
warrant had expired, a new warrant had to be
issued based on a ﬁnding of probable cause
existing at that time. The vote at conference
was also 7-2 and with the same line-up,98 but
some intracurial developments between
the initial vote and the announcement of the
decision shed light on McReynolds’s separate
concurrence. After the October 15 conference
at which the initial vote was taken, the case
was assigned to McReynolds. However, at
the November 12 conference, held after
McReynolds’s opinion had been circulated,
the Justices discussed a memorandum on the
case that had been prepared by the Chief
Justice.99 From the published opinions it
appears that McReynolds favored a “deﬁnite
rule” that “no search warrant should issue
upon an afﬁdavit more than ten days old.”100
Hughes, by contrast, argued that, though the
statute did not “ﬁx the time within which
proof of probable cause must be taken” by the
magistrate, “the proof must be of facts so
closely related to the time of the issue of the
warrant as to justify a ﬁnding of probable
cause at that time.” Whether the proof met
this test, Hughes maintained, “must be
determined by the circumstances of each
case.”101 Van Devanter remarked that he
“Thought memo an improvement,” but Butler
records that “C.J.’s memo not accepted by
McR. . . . Supported his op.—aff. and state

why (?)—Leaves every case on its own
bottom.”102 The conference then voted to
accept the Hughes memo. Both Butler and
Roberts record the vote as 5-3, with McReynolds, Stone, and Cardozo dissenting, and
Butler passing.103 The case was then reassigned to Hughes,104 who produced the
majority opinion.105
Two landmark First Amendment cases
and a naturalization case round out this
category of early Hughes Court decisions. In
Stromberg v. California,106 which invalidated
California’s statute prohibiting display of a red
ﬂag as “a symbol or emblem of opposition
to organized government,” McReynolds and
Butler were the only dissenters both at
conference and in the published decision.
All Four Horsemen dissented both in conference and from the published opinion in Near v.
Minnesota,107 which invalidated as an unconstitutional prior restraint a statute authorizing
suits to enjoin newspaper publishers of
“malicious, scandalous and defamatory”
material from future publication on pain of
contempt. United States v. McIntosh,108 which
upheld the denial of naturalization to a
Canadian citizen who declined to take the
oath of allegiance without qualiﬁcation,
was also 5-4 both at conference and in the
published decision. This time, however,
the Four Horsemen and Roberts were in the
majority, with Hughes, Holmes, Brandeis, and
Stone in dissent.
Vote Changes in Non-Unanimous
Decisions
Perhaps the most prominent early
Hughes Court decision in this category is
one about which the internal evidence for its
inclusion is conﬂicting. In the 1927 case of
Nixon v. Herndon,109 the Court had unanimously invalidated a Texas statute excluding
African Americans from participation in
the state Democratic party’s primary elections. The 1932 case of Nixon v. Condon110
invalidated a revised version of the “white
primary” concocted in the wake of Herndon.
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Rather than the state directly specifying the
eligibility criteria for participation in primary
elections, the Texas legislature authorized
the political parties to do so. The Democratic
party in turn promulgated qualiﬁcations
that excluded African Americans. The central
question was whether the action of the
legislature in authorizing the parties to
promulgate qualiﬁcations under which African-American voters would be excluded from
voting constituted state action triggering
application of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. The intracurial proceedings
produced divergent accounts in the docket
books. Stone records the conference vote as
identical with the ﬁnal vote of 5-4, with the
Four Horsemen dissenting, but he does not
date the conference.111 Roberts’s account
suggests that a vote taken at the January 9
conference may initially have been unanimous to reverse the lower court decision
upholding the arrangement, with Brandeis not
voting. But the vote notations suggesting this
are then crossed out, and the case was
“Restored to docket for reargument at a
time to be later ﬁxed by the Court.” The case
was reargued March 15, and Roberts records
that on March 19 the Court voted 5-4 to
reverse.112 Butler, by contrast, records the
initial conference as taking place on January
16. At this conference, Butler records Hughes
as saying, “Party control important. Regulation not enough—15[th] Am[endment] no[t]
appl. to primary. ‘Much’ then came out as
holding ‘state action.’” Hughes concluded,
“No state action.” To this Holmes replied,
“That attitude is form of words.” Van
Devanter agreed with Hughes, McReynolds
voted to afﬁrm, and Brandeis maintained
“This is state action.” Sutherland is recorded
as “1þ,” that is, agreeing with Hughes
with some qualiﬁcation. Butler agreed with
Hughes, and Roberts and Cardozo both
agreed with Holmes. The conference vote
appears to have been equally divided with
Holmes, Brandeis, Roberts, and Stone arrayed against the Four Horsemen, and the
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Chief Justice not voting. The case was
restored to the docket on January 18, and,
after the March 15 reargument, the Court met
again to discuss the case on March 19. Here
again Hughes is recorded as saying, “Reg. by
state of primaries not enough.” It appears that
the vote may again have been equally divided,
with Cardozo taking the position previously
adopted by the now-retired Holmes. Butler
never recorded a vote in the case for Hughes,
and Butler’s record of Hughes’s comments at
the March 19th conference does not suggest a
vote to reverse. It may be that the docket book
entries made by Stone and Roberts were
recorded after that conference, when the
Chief announced his conclusion. The decision was not announced until May 2, so it
appears that the Chief Justice may have taken
some time in ﬁnally seeing his way clear to
joining the majority.113
In Funk v. United States,114 the Court
held that in a federal criminal trial the wife of
the accused is a competent witness on his
behalf. The ﬁnal vote was 7-2, with McReynolds and Butler dissenting, and Cardozo
concurring in the result. At the conference,
however, Van Devanter and Brandeis also
had cast dissenting votes. In United States v.
Murdock,115 the Court held, over the dissents
of Stone and Cardozo, that it was reversible
error for the trial judge to inform the jury of
his view that the accused was guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. The conference vote
was 6-2, with McReynolds passing.116 And,
in Sorrells v. United States,117 the Court
reversed a conviction on the grounds that
the Prohibition Act had not been intended to
apply to circumstances in which an otherwise
innocent defendant had been lured into a sale
of liquor at the instigation of a Prohibition
agent—and evidence of entrapment had not
been permitted to go to the jury. The ﬁnal vote
was 5-4, with McReynolds, Brandeis, Stone,
and Roberts dissenting, but this was preceded
by a good deal of movement behind the
scenes. At the conference the vote was 5-2,
with McReynolds and Roberts in the
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minority, and Stone and Cardozo passing.
Before the decision was announced Cardozo
would join the majority, Stone would cast his
lot with the dissenters, and Brandeis would
defect from the majority to the dissent.
Two important immigration and naturalization decisions also witnessed vote shifts
between the conference vote and the ﬁnal
vote on the merits. In United States v.
Bland,118 the Court upheld denial of naturalization to a Canadian citizen who declined to
take the oath of allegiance without qualiﬁcation. The ﬁnal vote was 5-4, with Hughes,
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone dissenting. At
the conference, however, the vote had been 63, with Stone in the majority. And in Hansen
v. Haff, 119 the Court rejected an attempt to
deport a Danish woman who returned to the
United States with the intention of continuing
to engage in illicit sexual relations with a
married man, refusing to characterize her
entry as one for an “immoral purpose.” Butler
authored a lone dissent from the published
decision, but at the conference he had been
joined in opposition by Brandeis.
Finally, in United States v. Limehouse,120
the Court upheld the conviction of a man for
mailing “ﬁlthy” letters containing language
Brandeis’s majority opinion described as
“coarse, vulgar, disgusting, indecent, unquestionably ﬁlthy” and “foul.”121 The published opinion notes a lone dissent without
opinion by McReynolds, with Cardozo
taking no part. At the conference, however,
Stone records that Sutherland and Butler
were also in the minority.122 Butler records
that the vote was initially 4-4, but that
Roberts “changed to get majority,” making it
5-3. Butler further records Hughes as saying
of Mr. Limehouse’s missives, “Yes ﬁlthy.
Foul.”123
In the domain of economic regulation,
two important state police power cases saw
changes in alignments between the conference vote and the ﬁnal vote on the merits.
As mentioned above, New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann124 struck down a statute that

required those seeking a license to manufacture, sell, or distribute ice to demonstrate that
existing licensed facilities in the community
were inadequate to meet the public’s needs.
The ﬁnal vote was 6-2, with Cardozo taking
no part and Stone joining Brandeis’s nowfamous dissent. At the conference, however,
the vote was 6-1, with Stone passing. It is
clear, however, that Stone was already
leaning toward dissent. Butler records him
at conference as saying, “Can’t say a priori
state can’t do this.”125 McReynolds, who had
narrower notions of federal jurisdiction than
did most of his colleagues,126 stated, “Fed
court doesn’t deal with this.” In presenting
the case, Hughes stated, “No satisfactory
criteria of ‘affected with a public interest.’
Differs in relation of things. Test: ‘inherent in
liberty’ right to engage in ordinary occupation.”127 These remarks indicate that Hughes
objected to the fact that the statute created a
barrier to entry for a common calling—
something to which he had objected as an
Associate Justice,128 and to which he would
again object later in the decade.129 Roberts,
who would vote with Hughes in these later
cases as well, expressed his agreement with
the Chief Justice. Butler records Hughes as
making one other remark: “‘Cotton Ginning’
dif—.” Butler likewise has Sutherland agreeing that “Cotton Gin is different.”130 The
reference here was to a recent Tenth Circuit
decision sustaining a statute treating the
business of cotton ginning as affected with
a public interest,131 which the appellant in
Liebmann invoked in support of the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s similar treatment of
the ice business.132 In his opinion for the
majority, Sutherland explained that cotton
gins were affected with a public interest
because they held a de facto monopoly in
the provision of a necessary service, and
therefore were in a position to subject
growers to “exorbitant charges and arbitrary
control.”133 By contrast, Sutherland argued,
the business of ice making was not a practical
monopoly, and therefore could not be
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regulated as a business affected with a public
interest.134
In Stephenson v. Binford,135 the Court
upheld a regulation issued by the Texas
Railroad Commission requiring private contract carriers to charge certain minimum rates
for transport. The regulation had been
imposed in order to protect the state’s rail
carriers from the destructive competition of
private carriers. The Court did not consider
whether the competitive threat alone justiﬁed
the regulation, nor did the Court reach the
issue of whether the private carriers conducted a business affected with a public
interest. Instead, Sutherland’s opinion for the
majority upheld the regulation on the grounds
that “the highways of the state are public
property; that their primary and preferred use
is for private purposes; and that their use for
purposes of gain is special and extraordinary,
which, generally at least, the legislature may
prohibit or condition as it sees ﬁt.”136 The
impression that the Justices were casting
about for a rationale upon which the order
might be sustained is conﬁrmed by Butler’s
account of the conference. Hughes opened the
conference by asserting, inter alia, “Price
ﬁxing is good.” Van Devanter passed, at
which point McReynolds opined that “State
should regulate. But can’t ﬁx prices.” Sutherland told his colleagues, “Want to sustain.
Not a business impressed with a public
interest. Might be sustained as a [illegible]
measure.”137 After this discussion, the conference vote yielded a 7-2 majority in favor of
upholding the order, with McReynolds and
Butler dissenting.138 Before the judgment
was announced, however, McReynolds abandoned his friend and acquiesced in the
opinion of the majority. In the end, Butler
dissented alone.139
Similar dynamics were at play in the
divisive domain of intergovernmental tax
immunity. In Educational Films Corp. v.
Ward,140 a 6-3 majority held that a state tax
that included as income royalties received
from copyrights obtained under federal law
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did not infringe the constitutional tax immunity of the federal government. The conference vote was 5-4, with all Four Horsemen in
the minority, but in the end McReynolds
acquiesced in Stone’s majority opinion. In
Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States,141
only Brandeis and Stone dissented from the
holding that a sale of a motorcycle to a
municipal corporation of Massachusetts
could not be subjected to federal taxation.
Holmes had voted with them at the conference, but in the published decision he
dutifully engaged in his common practice
of quasi-acquiescence, noting that he regarded the decision in Panhandle Oil Co. v.
Knox142 “as controlling in principle and upon
that ground acquiesces in this decision.”143
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.144
involved land that the federal government had
granted to the state of Oklahoma for the
purpose of supporting common schools. The
state in turn leased the land to the company for
the purpose of extraction of oil and gas. A
portion of the gross production from the site
was reserved to the state, with the balance
being sold by the company. The Court held
that the company was an instrumentality of the
state for purposes of generating revenue to
support the public schools, and that the income
from sales of the oil and gas produced at the
site was constitutionally immune from federal
taxation. In doing so, the majority felt bound
by the precedent of Gillespie v. Oklahoma,145
and McReynolds’s opinion for the Court
pledged to construe that precedent strictly.146
This was not enough to satisfy the dissenters,
who called for Gillespie to be overruled.147 It
was in Burnet that Brandeis famously wrote
that “Stare decisis is usually the wise policy,
because, in most matters, it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right . . . But in cases involving
the Federal Constitution, where correction
through legislative action is practically impossible . . . this court should refuse to follow
an earlier constitutional decision which it
deems erroneous.”148
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Brandeis must have been particularly
disappointed by the result in Burnet, because
there was a time when it seemed that a
majority was within his grasp. The original
argument was held on January 15, 1932,149
and the conference was held the following
day. The conference vote was 4-4: the Four
Horsemen voted to invalidate the tax as
applied, while Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, and
Roberts voted to uphold application of the
tax.150 It is likely that Holmes would have
been inclined to join with Brandeis, et al., but
he had resigned from the Court just three days
before the argument.151 In his presentation to
the conference, Hughes opined that “Oil
Co. not state instrumentality.”152 But because
Hughes was unable to persuade any of the
Horsemen to his views, the case was held
over for further consideration, and passed
over at the February 13 conference.153 On
February 15, President Hoover nominated
Cardozo to replace Holmes. Cardozo’s rapid
conﬁrmation seemed assured,154 and there
was probably little doubt in the minds of his
future colleagues which way he would vote in
Burnet. At the February 20 conference, the
Justices restored the case to the docket for
reargument,155 and Cardozo took his seat on
March 2. The second argument was held
March 16,156 and on March 19 the Justices
again met to vote on the case. As anticipated,
Cardozo voted with Brandeis. In the meantime, however, the Chief Justice had slipped
away. Apparently lured by the call of stare
decisis, Hughes defected from what would
have been a majority to overrule Gillespie to
create instead a majority to preserve and
follow it.157 It may well have been these
frustrating events behind the scenes that
inspired Brandeis to select this particular
occasion to deliver his celebrated remarks on
the role of precedent in constitutional
adjudication.158
Consider ﬁnally Crowell v. Benson,159 a
1932 decision upholding and construing the
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Act of
1927, and a landmark in the development of

administrative law. At the conference on
October 31, 1931, the vote was 8-1 to afﬁrm,
with only Brandeis dissenting. Between the
time of the conference vote and the announcement of the ﬁnal decision, there were
two important developments relative to the
case. First, Holmes retired the following
January, shrinking the majority to seven
Justices, and Cardozo was not conﬁrmed
until after the opinion had been delivered.
Second, Stone and Roberts defected from
the majority to join Brandeis in dissent. The
result was the 5-3 division that appears in the
published report of the decision.160

Reassignments
It is well known that Van Devanter was
the Hughes Court’s least productive writer of
opinions.161 In 1960, Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. reported that:
In conference, Van Devanter’s lucidity, knowledge, and sweetness of
manner commanded the respectful
attention even of brethren who
detested his conclusions. But at his
desk, an awful paralysis overtook
him; and he could only rarely get his
views down on paper. By 1931 and
1932 his production had slowed
down to one opinion a year. Sometimes Hughes would take cases back
from him. “You are overworked,”
he would say with ambiguous and
sardonic courtesy. “Let me relieve
you of some of your burden.”162
The docket books enable us to verify the
substance of this claim, and to identify other
instances in which a case initially assigned to
one Justice was later transferred to another.
During the 1930 Term, Van Devanter gave
up three cases, one each to Holmes,163
Roberts,164 and McReynolds.165 The following year, Van Devanter relinquished two
cases to Hughes,166 while Stone accepted one
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from the Chief Justice167 and Cardozo took a
case from McReynolds168 in which the latter
ultimately dissented.169 For the 1932 Term,
Van Devanter handed off an opinion each to
Roberts170 and Hughes,171 and Roberts
relieved Stone of a case172 in which the latter
ultimately dissented.173 As discussed above,
Hughes assumed control of the opinion in
Sgro v. United States after the conference
expressed its preference for his memorandum
over McReynolds’s draft opinion.174 And
during the 1933 Term, Van Devanter released
opinions to Stone175 and Cardozo,176 while
accepting one from McReynolds.177 Most of
the reassignments that Hughes ordered during
the early years of his tenure as Chief Justice
thus resulted either from changes in the vote
after the conference, or from Van Devanter’s
inability to produce an opinion in a case with
which he had been entrusted.

Conclusion
In addition to the information that they
provide about the Court’s deliberations in
particular cases, the docket books of the early
Hughes Court Justices teach us some larger
lessons. First, they conﬁrm Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s claim that Hughes occasionally
was obliged to relieve Van Devanter of his
literary burdens, and they show that the few
other instances in which Hughes reassigned
cases typically involved a post-conference
voting shift.
Second, the docket books teach us that
McReynolds’s published record in cases
involving political economy would lead one
to believe that he was more amenable to
regulation and taxation than his conference
conduct would indicate. Though he ultimately joined the majorities in Federal Trade
Commission v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., United
States v. Louisiana, Stephenson v. Binford,
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, and Educational
Films Corp. v. Ward, he cast a dissenting vote
in each of these cases at conference. In
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addition, though he ultimately voted to
uphold government regulation in FTC v.
Algoma Lumber Co., at the conference vote
he passed. The published decisions can also
be misleading concerning McReynolds’s
views in cases involving civil rights and civil
liberties. Though he ultimately joined majorities favoring such claims in many cases, at
conference he passed in United States v.
Lefkowitz and United States v. Murdock. And
assuming that Butler’s notes on the conference discussion in Nixon v. Condon faithfully
record the Chief Justice’s remarks, Hughes
was less inclined to strong protections of
voting rights than his vote in the published
opinion would suggest.
The civil liberties views of Stone and
Cardozo also are illuminated by the docket
book records. These two Justices publicly
dissented from a number of decisions reversing criminal convictions178—indeed, Stone
complained that Butler was soft on
crime179—but their conference votes reveal
them to be even less favorably inclined
toward claims of the accused than their
published votes would suggest. Cardozo
joined the majority in Gebardi v. United
States, but at conference he had dissented.
Stone ultimately joined the majorities in
Sorrells v. United States and United States v.
LaFranca, but at conference he passed in the
former and dissented in the latter. And,
though Stone ultimately joined the dissenters
in United States v. Bland, at the conference he
voted with the majority.
The docket books also reveal considerable ﬂuidity between the initial conference
vote and the ﬁnal vote on the merits among
the Justices of the early Hughes Court. First,
there were nine instances of defection in
major cases. Stone was responsible for six of
these, departing from a conference vote with
the majority in Bland and Crowell, and from a
passing conference vote in Sorrells, Liggett,
Rock Island, and Liebmann, though Butler’s
conference notes indicate that Stone was
already inclined to join Brandeis in his
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Liebmann dissent. Holmes departed from a
passing conference vote in Rock Island,
Brandeis ultimately abandoned his vote
with the Sorrells conference majority, and
Roberts joined in Stone’s defection from the
Crowell conference majority. Thus, four of
these defections were of the strong variety,
and ﬁve of the weak variety. Second, there
also were shifts in voting that created
majorities where none had formed at the
conference. Hughes was responsible for two
such instances, shifting his vote to form new
5-4 majorities for positions that he had
initially opposed in conference in Nixon v.
Condon and Burnet. Similarly, Roberts
shifted his initial conference vote in Limehouse in order to transform a 4-4 deadlock
into a majority for afﬁrmance. Third, though
Holmes voted with the dissenters at the
Indian Motorcycle conference, he ultimately
adhered to his custom of quasi-acquiescence.
The most common form of vote ﬂuidity
on the early Hughes Court, however, was
acquiescence. Of the thirty-four unanimous
decisions discussed here, twenty-one (61.8%)
also were unanimous at conference, but
thirteen (38.2%) were not. This observation
is consistent with earlier studies ﬁnding that
conformity voting is the most common form
of vote ﬂuidity.180 The frequency with which
each of the Justices acquiesced in the views of
the majority is worthy of note. The notoriously cantankerous and disagreeable Justice
McReynolds was actually the member of the
Court most likely to acquiesce in a decision in
order to produce unanimity. Of the thirteen
unanimous decisions examined here that
were not unanimous at conference, McReynolds acquiesced in seven (53.8%). By
contrast, Sutherland did so in three (23.1%),
Brandeis and Stone in two (15.4%) each, and
Holmes, Van Devanter, Butler, and Cardozo
in one (7.7%) each. Of these eighteen
instances of acquiescence, eleven were of
the strong variety, six of the weak variety, and
the character of the last cannot be determined
with conﬁdence.181

With respect to cases that did not produce
unanimity, McReynolds and Brandeis each
acquiesced in three, while Van Devanter,
Sutherland, Butler, and Cardozo each acquiesced in one. Of these ten instances of
acquiescence, eight were of the strong variety,
and two were of the weak sort.182 Thus, of
these twenty-eight instances of acquiescence
in major cases decided by the early Hughes
Court, nineteen were of the strong variety,
eight of the weak variety, and the character of
one cannot be determined with conﬁdence.
McReynolds alone was responsible for 35.7%
of these instances of acquiescence, recording
ten in all. By contrast, Brandeis accounted for
ﬁve (17.9%), Sutherland for four (14.3%), and
Van Devanter, Butler, Stone, and Cardozo for
two (7.1%) each. Expressed as a percentage of
acquiescences per conference vote in which
he participated, McReynolds acquiesced in
18.2% of such cases, Brandeis in 8.5%,
Sutherland in 6.8%, and Van Devanter, Butler,
and Stone in 3.4% each.183 Of all of the early
Hughes Court Justices, the only Justices who
did not acquiesce in any of the cases examined
here were the two who sat at the Court’s center
of gravity: Hughes and Roberts. The fact that
McReynolds was the early Hughes Court
Justice most likely to acquiesce in major
decisions echoes Professor Saul Brenner’s
ﬁnding that on the Vinson Court “extreme
justices [were] most likely to be closer to the
mean at the ﬁnal vote than at the original vote,”
because “extreme justices are likely to lose
more often at the original vote.”184
The fact that two of the most senior
Justices—McReynolds and Brandeis—were
those who most frequently acquiesced in the
conference majority’s judgment in major
cases also indicates that newcomers to the
early Hughes Court did not experience the
kind of freshman effect with respect to voting
ﬂuidity that some scholars have found on
other Courts. Indeed, the only Justices to
acquiesce in fewer major cases than Cardozo
were Hughes and Roberts, and Roberts
acquiesced in none. Moreover, both Roberts
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and Cardozo would continue to acquiesce in
major cases at comparable or higher rates
later into their tenures on the Court.185 This
ﬁnding would appear to be in tension with
Paul Freund’s recollection that Cardozo often
changed his vote between the conference vote
and the ﬁnal vote on the merits during the
1932 Term. However, Freund reported that,
“As far as I could make out, [Cardozo’s]
disagreements [with the majority in conference]—this being his ﬁrst full term on the
Court—derived from the fact that in New
York he had been accustomed to a rather
different set of procedural rules and substantive rules intermeshed with procedure, so that
some things which were decided one way in
the federal courts would have been decided
differently in New York,” and that this is what
may have accounted for the Justice’s allegedly frequent changes of vote between the
conference and the ﬁnal vote on the merits.186
This suggests the possibility that Cardozo
may have exhibited greater freshman vote
ﬂuidity in less salient cases not examined
here.187
The Justices of the early Hughes Court,
seven of whom were holdovers from the Taft
Court, thus carried forward the practices so
carefully cultivated by Hughes’s predecessor
as Chief Justice. Taft is famous for his
“consuming ambition” to “mass the Court”—
to build unanimity so as to give “weight and
solidity” to its decisions.188 The Taft Court
achieved unanimity in a remarkable percentage of its cases. For the 1921-1928 Terms,
84% of the Court’s published opinions were
unanimous;189 taking into account all of its
decisions for the entirety of Taft’s tenure, the
unanimity rate was 91.4%.190 This rate of
unanimity was in line with the rates achieved
by the White Court, on which Holmes, Van
Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, and
Hughes each had served,191 and the attitudes
formed under White and his predecessors
appear to have contributed to the persistence
of this phenomenon. Taft discouraged dissents, believing that most of them were
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displays of egotism that weakened the
Court’s prestige and contributed little of
value.192 As a consequence, he worked hard
to minimize disagreement, often sacriﬁcing
the expression of his own personal views.193
Van Devanter shared Taft’s distaste for
public displays of discord, and strongly
lobbied his colleagues to suppress their
dissenting views.194 Butler similarly regarded
dissents as exercises of “vanity” that “seldom
aid us in the right development or statement
of the law,” and instead “often do harm.”195
He therefore commonly “acquiesce[d] for
the sake of harmony & the Court.”196
McReynolds and Sutherland expressed similar views, and suppressed dissenting opinions
accordingly.197 Even the “great dissenters,”
Holmes and Brandeis, believed that dissents
should be aired sparingly, and often
“shut up,” as Holmes liked to put it, when
their views departed from those of their
colleagues.198
Like Taft, Hughes “sought to present a
united Court to the public,”199 frequently
suppressing his own views for the sake of
unanimity. As he wrote on his return of one
of Stone’s draft opinions, “I choke a little at
swallowing your analysis, still I do not think it
would serve any useful purpose to expose my
views.”200 In his efforts “to ﬁnd common
ground upon which all could stand,” Hughes
“was willing to modify his own opinions to
hold or increase his majority; and if this
meant he had to put in some disconnected
thoughts or sentences, in they went.”201 And
while Hughes dissented at a higher rate as
Chief Justice than had White or Taft, he did so
at a much lower rate than would Stone, Fred
Vinson, or Earl Warren.202
A variety of factors may have contributed to what Dean Robert Post calls this “norm
of acquiescence.”203 Here I wish to highlight
just a few. First, the literature of the period
illustrates among the bench and bar a widely
held aversion to dissents as excessively selfregarding, and as weakening the force of
judicial decisions by unsettling the law.204
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This conviction found expression in Canon
19 of the American Bar Association’s Canons
of Judicial Ethics, which exhorted judges not
to “yield to pride of opinion or value more
highly his individual reputation than that
of the court to which he should be loyal.
Except in cases of conscientious difference of
opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting
opinions should be discouraged in courts of
last resort.” Instead, “judges constituting a
court of last resort” were admonished to “use
effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity
of conclusion and the consequent inﬂuence of
judicial decision.”205 Taft was the chair of the
committee that drafted the Canons, and
Sutherland was a committee member before
his appointment to the Court.206 Second, the
norm of acquiescence promoted a collegiality
and reciprocity among the Justices that
smoothed over potential conﬂicts and
avoided alienating colleagues whose support
one might need in future cases.207 Third,
during this period nearly all of the Justices
had only one clerk rather than the four that
Justices typically have today, and most of the
Justices wrote their own opinions.208 With
such comparatively limited resources at their
disposal, the cost of preparing a dissenting
opinion was considerably higher.209
The unanimity rates of the early Hughes
Court were remarkably similar to those of
the White and Taft Courts. For the 1930 Term
the rate was 89.2%; for the 1931 Term it was
82.7%; for the 1932 Term it was 83.9%; and
for the 1933 Term it was 83.5%. Even during
the height of the Court’s encounter with the
New Deal, unanimity rates remained robust:
85.9% for the 1934 Term; 82.1% for the
fractious 1935 Term; and 79.2% during the
1936 Term. With the addition of the
Roosevelt appointees beginning in the 1937
Term, however, unanimity rates began a
decline from which they would never recover: 69.7% for the 1937 Term; 64% for the
1938 Term; 69.3% for the 1939 Term; and
71.5% for Hughes’s last Term as Chief
Justice. And after Hughes departed the

Bench, it would be the exceedingly rare
Term that would produce a unanimity rate
exceeding 50%.210 The early Terms of the
Hughes Court thus constituted the twilight of
a longstanding set of institutional norms and
practices.
Author’s Note: Thanks to Matthew
Hofstedt, Devon Burge, Franz Jantzen,
Lauren Morrell, Nikki Peronace, and Erin
Huckle, all of the Ofﬁce of the Curator of the
Supreme Court of the United States, for their
kind hospitality and splendid assistance with
the Hughes Court docket books; to Dwight
King, Kent Olson, Cathy Palombi, and Jon
Ashley for their cheerful and excellent
research assistance; and to participants
in the Notre Dame Law School Faculty
Colloquium for valuable comments and
conversation.
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289 U.S. 466 (1933); Stone OT 1932 Docket Book;
Butler OT 1932 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1932 Docket
Book.
56
281 U.S. 370 (1930); Stone OT 1929 Docket Book.
Sanford and McReynolds were absent from the conference, but all of those present voted to uphold the
appropriation.
57
283 U.S. 553 (1931).
58
Stone OT 1930 Docket Book. This characterization
may be a reﬂection of notations in Roberts’s docket book
indicating that three of the Justices initially voted the
other way. Roberts’s record shows votes to afﬁrm
crossed out, with votes to reverse entered next to them,
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for Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone. Roberts OT 1930
Docket Book.
59
290 U.S. 1 (1933); Stone OT 1933 Docket Book
records Sutherland as dissenting at conference; Butler
OT 1933 Docket Book records him as passing; Roberts
OT 1933 Docket Book records him as “Not Voting.”
60
290 U.S. 570 (1934); Stone OT 1933 Docket Book;
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book. Roberts recorded the vote
as unanimous. Roberts OT 1933 Docket Book.
61
292 U.S. 426 (1934) (Van Devanter, McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Butler concurred specially); Stone OT
1933 Docket Book; Butler OT 1933 Docket Book;
Roberts OT 1933 Docket Book.
62
291 U.S. 67 (1934); Stone OT 1933 Docket Book;
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1933 Docket
Book.
63
291 U.S. 304 (1934); Stone OT 1933 Docket Book;
Roberts OT 1933 Docket Book; Butler OT 1933 Docket
Book (Hughes describing the practice in question as
“reprehensible”).
64
286 U.S. 123 (1932); Stone OT 1931 Docket Book;
Butler OT 1931 Docket Book; Roberts 1931 OT Docket
Book. Stone has an erased vote in the Chief Justice’s
column, which might suggest a possible change of vote
on his part. However, no such record appears in either the
Butler or the Roberts docket books.
65
290 U.S. 70 (1933); Stone OT 1933 Docket Book;
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1933 Docket
Book.
66
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book.
67
282 U.S. 568 (1931).
68
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
69
Stone records Brandeis as voting with Holmes and
Stone, and records no vote for McReynolds. Stone OT
1930 Docket Book. Roberts, by contrast, lists both
McReynolds and Brandeis as voting with the majority,
though he has a crossed-out vote the other way in the
Brandeis column, suggesting that Brandeis may have
changed his vote at the conference. Roberts OT 1930
Docket Book. Stone later wrote to Felix Frankfurter that
Brandeis’s opinion in Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S.
391 (1938) “reaches ﬁnally a result which I tried very
hard to have the Court adopt in the La Franca case.”
Stone to Frankfurter, March 7, 1938, quoted in MASON,
HARLAN FISKE STONE at 556.
70
281 U.S. 276 (1930). Hughes took no part in the
decision. Sanford agreed to the disposition before his
untimely death. Id. at 313.
71
Stone OT 1929 Docket Book.
72
282 U.S. 687 (1931); Stone OT 1930 Docket Book;
Robert OT 1930 Docket Book.
73
Stone OT 1931 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1931
Docket Book.
74
285 U.S. 452 (1932). Cardozo took no part in the
decision.
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Butler OT 1931 Docket Book.
287 U.S. 112 (1932); Stone OT 1932 Docket Book;
Butler OT 1932 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1932 Docket
Book; Cardozo OT 1932 Docket Book.
77
Butler OT 1932 Docket Book.
78
282 U.S. 251 (1931); Stone OT 1930 Docket Book;
Roberts OT 1930 Docket Book.
79
290 U.S. 398 (1934); Stone OT 1933 Docket Book;
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1933 Docket
Book.
80
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book. See 290 U.S. at 421 n.3.
81
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book. See 189 Minn. 422,
429-30 (1933).
82
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book. See 290 U.S. at 423.
83
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book. See 290 U.S. at 423 n.4.
84
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book. See 290 U.S. at 423
n.4.
85
199 U.S. 473 (1905). Butler OT 1933 Docket Book.
86
290 U.S. at 437. Hughes also made “Reference to
difference between ’direct’ and ‘incidental.’ ‘Emergency’ may authorize direct-earthquake & ‘Economic’ may
be the same—The question is ‘does such an emergency
exist?’” Butler OT 1933 Docket Book.
86
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
87
291 U.S. 502 (1934); Stone OT 1933 Docket Book;
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1933 Docket
Book.
88
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book.
89
285 U.S. 262 (1932). See infra.
90
262 U.S. 522 (1923).
91
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book.
92
291 U.S. at 511-14.
93
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
94
See JAMES GOODWIN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994); DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A
TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rev. ed.
1979).
95
Stone OT 1932 Docket Book; Butler OT 1932 Docket
Book; Roberts OT 1932 Docket Book.
96
Butler OT 1932 Docket Book.
97
287 U.S. 206 (1932).
98
Stone OT 1932 Docket Book; Butler OT 1932 Docket
Book; Roberts OT 1932 Docket Book; Cardozo OT 1932
Docket Book.
99
Butler OT 1932 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1932
Docket Book.
100
287 U.S. at 215-16.
101
Id. at 210-11.
102
Butler OT 1932 Docket Book.
103
Butler OT 1932 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1932
Docket Book.
104
Roberts OT 1932 Docket Book.
105
See also Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932)
(holding 7-2, with Stone and Cardozo dissenting both at
conference and from the published decision, that the
76

warrant authorizing a search was invalid); Stone OT
1932 Docket Book; Butler OT 1932 Docket Book;
Roberts OT 1932 Docket Book; Cardozo OT 1932
Docket Book.
106
283 U.S. 359 (1931); Roberts OT 1930 Docket Book.
107
283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stone OT 1930 Docket Book;
Roberts OT 1930 Docket Book.
108
283 U.S. 605 (1931); Stone OT 1930 Docket Book;
Roberts OT 1930 Docket Book. MacIntosh was
anticipated by the late Taft Court decision in Schwimmer
v. United States, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), which upheld the
denial of naturalization to a forty-nine-year-old foreign
woman who would not swear to take up arms in defense
of the United States. The ﬁnal vote was 6-3, with Holmes,
Brandeis, and Sanford dissenting. Stone listed the
conference vote as 5-3 with Sutherland absent, but he
placed a question mark next to Sanford’s dissenting vote,
and wrote next to his own ultimate vote with the majority,
presumably entered later, “passed on the ﬁnal vote.”
Stone OT 1928 Docket Book. See RONALD B.
FLOWERS, TO DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION:
RELIGION, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION, NATURALIZATION, AND THE SUPREME COURT
(2003).
109
273 U.S. 536 (1927).
110
286 U.S. 73 (1932).
111
Stone OT 1931 Docket Book.
112
Roberts OT 1931 Docket Book.
113
Butler OT 1931 Docket Book.
114
290 U.S. 371 (1933); Stone OT 1933 Docket Book;
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1933 Docket
Book.
115
290 U.S. 389 (1933).
116
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1933
Docket Book. Stone OT 1933 Docket Book records the
vote as 5-2 with Brandeis not voting, but this appears to
be an error.
117
287 U.S. 435 (1932); Stone OT 1932 Docket Book;
Butler OT 1932 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1932 Docket
Book; Cardozo OT 1932 Docket Book.
118
283 U.S. 636 (1931); Stone OT 1930 Docket Book;
Roberts OT 1930 Docket Book.
119
291 U.S. 559 (1934); Stone OT 1933 Docket Book;
Butler OT 1933 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1933 Docket
Book.
120
285 U.S. 424 (1932).
121
Id. at 425.
122
Stone OT 1931 Docket Book.
123
Butler OT 1931 Docket Book.
124
285 U.S. 262 (1932); Stone OT 1931 Docket Book;
Butler OT 1931 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1931 Docket
Book.
125
Butler OT 1931 Docket Book.
126
See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, The BrandeisFrankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 299,
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317 (Brandeis opining that “McR. cares more about
jurisdictional restraints than any of them”).
127
Butler OT 1931 Docket Book.
128
See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 31 (1915) (Hughes,
J.) (“It requires no argument to show that the right to
work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal freedom
and opportunity that it was the purpose of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.”).
129
See, e.g., Mayﬂower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297
U.S. 266, 273 (1936) (Roberts, J., in an opinion joined
by Hughes, C.J.) (striking down a statute that effectively
provided that “during the life of the law no person
or corporation might enter the business of a milk dealer
in New York City”); United States v. Rock Royal
Cooperative, 307 U.S. 533, 587 (1939) (Roberts, J., in a
dissenting opinion joined by Hughes, C.J.) (objecting to a
federal milk marketing regulation that “inevitably tend[ed]
to destroy the business of smaller [milk] handlers by
placing them at the mercy of their larger competitors.”).
130
Butler OT 1931 Docket Book.
131
Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Cotton County Co., 40
F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1930).
132
285 U.S. at 263.
133
285 U.S. at 276-77.
134
Id. at 277-79.
135
287 U.S. 251 (1932).
136
287 U.S. at 264.
137
Butler OT 1932 Docket Book.
138
Stone OT 1932 Docket Book; Butler OT 1932
Docket Book; Roberts OT 1932 Docket Book; Cardozo
OT 1932 Docket Book.
139
A third state police power case, Louis K. Liggett Co.
v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933), held that a statute imposing a
heavier privilege tax per store on an owner whose stores
were in different counties than on an owner whose stores
were all in the same county was arbitrary and violated the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ﬁnal vote
was 6-3, with Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo dissenting,
but at the conference Stone passed. Butler OT 1932
Docket Book; Roberts OT 1932 Docket Book; Cardozo
OT 1932 Docket Book. Stone records the vote as 5-3 to
reverse, with Brandeis, Roberts, and Cardozo dissenting
and Stone passing, suggesting that Roberts changed his
vote after conference. Two years earlier, the Court had
upheld a progressive tax on chain stores in State Board of
Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931).
Both the conference vote and the ﬁnal vote on the merits
had been 5-4, with the Four Horsemen in dissent. Stone
OT 1930 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1930 Docket Book.
140
282 U.S. 379 (1931); Stone OT 1930 Docket Book;
Roberts OT 1930 Docket Book.
141
283 U.S. 570 (1931); Stone OT 1930 Docket Book;
Roberts OT 1930 Docket Book.
142
277 U.S. 218 (1928).
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283 U.S. at 579.
285 U.S. 393 (1932).
145
257 U.S. 501 (1922).
146
285 U.S. at 398.
147
285 U.S. at 401.
148
285 U.S. at 406-10.
149
285 U.S. 393.
150
Stone OT 1931 Docket Book; Butler OT 1931
Docket Book; Roberts OT 1931 Docket Book.
151
284 U.S. iii.
152
Butler OT 1931 Docket Book.
153
Stone OT 1931 Docket Book; Butler OT 1931
Docket Book; Roberts OT 1931 Docket Book.
154
285 U.S. iii.
155
Stone OT 1931 Docket Book; Butler OT 1931
Docket Book; Roberts OT 1931 Docket Book.
156
285 U.S. 393.
157
Stone OT 1931 Docket Book; Butler OT 1931
Docket Book; Roberts OT 1931 Docket Book.
158
Another notable case involving a question of federal
power that witnessed vote changes between conference
and ﬁnal decision was Chicago, Rock Island & Paciﬁc
Railway Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80 (1931), which
invalidated an ICC order exempting certain “short line”
railroads from the obligation to pay a reasonable daily
rental fee for the use of other railroads’ cars under certain
circumstances. The vote in conference was 6-1, with
Brandeis dissenting and Holmes and Stone passing.
Stone OT 1931 Docket Book; Butler OT 1931 Docket
Book; Roberts OT 1931 Docket Book. In the published
decision, however, both Holmes and Stone joined
Brandeis’s dissent.
159
285 U.S. 22 (1932).
160
Stone OT 1931 Docket Book; Butler OT 1931
Docket Book; Roberts OT 1931 Docket Book. Mason
mistakenly asserts that “[a]t conference they had split 5 to
3.” MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE at 337. Mason
was perhaps led to this view because Stone wrote to
Hughes after the conference, “At the conference I
expressed doubt as to the construction given to the statute
by the majority of the Court, which doubt still persists.”
Stone to Hughes, Dec. 18, 1931, quoted in MASON,
HARLAN FISKE STONE at 338. The details of the
Stone and Roberts defections are well explained in
DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES
IN AMERICA, 1900-1940, pp. 176 n.9, 177 n.12 (2014).
161
See MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS
HUGHES 284 (1951) (discussing what Sutherland
referred to as Van Devanter’s “pen paralysis”).
162
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 456 (1960).
163
No. 66, Northport Power & Light Co. v. Hartley.
Stone OT 1930 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1930 Docket
Book.
144
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No. 81, Choteau v. Burnet. Stone OT 1930 Docket
Book; Roberts OT 1930 Docket Book.
165
No. 263, Maas & Waldsetin Co. v. U.S. Stone OT
1930 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1930 Docket Book.
166
Nos. 170, 245, Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, Butler
OT 1931 Docket Book; No. 790, Edwards v. U.S., Stone
OT 1931 Docket Book.
167
No. 158, Shriver v. Woodbine Savings Bank. Stone
OT 1931 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1931 Docket
Book.
168
No. 598, Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co. Stone OT
1931 Docket Book. Butler records that the initial vote
was taken on April 23, 1932, but that on April 30
McReynolds “Returned case to conference—new vote.”
Butler OT 1931 Docket Book.
169
286 U.S. 334, 346 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
170
No. 1, Texas & Paciﬁc Ry. Co. v. United States. Stone
OT 1932 Docket Book; Butler OT 1932 Docket Book.
171
Nos. 5-8-9, Original, Wisconsin v. Illinois. Stone OT
1932 Docket Book.
172
Nos. 316-318, U.S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.
Butler OT 1932 Docket Book.
173
289 U.S. 178, 209 (1933).
174
No. 55, Sgro v. U.S. Butler OT 1932 Docket Book;
Roberts OT 1932 Docket Book. McReynolds ﬁled a
concurring opinion, 287 U.S. 206, 212 (1932) (McReynolds, J., concurring).
175
No. 298, Nickey v. Mississippi. Stone OT 1933
Docket Book; Butler OT 1933 Docket Book; Roberts OT
1933 Docket Book.
176
No. 561, International Milling Co. v. Columbia
Transport Co. Stone OT 1933 Docket Book; Butler OT
1933 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1933 Docket Book.
177
No. 463, Elliot v. Lombard. Stone OT 1933 Docket
Book; Butler OT 1933 Docket Book.
178
See, e.g., Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. at 212
(Stone and Cardozo dissent from opinion holding search
unconstitutional); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. at 129
(Stone and Cardozo dissent from opinion holding search
unconstitutional); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937) (Cardozo writes and Stone joins opinion
holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply
to state criminal prosecutions).
179
Recollection of Herbert Wechsler in KATIE
LOUCHHEIM, THE MAKING OF THE NEW
DEAL: THE INSIDERS SPEAK 53 (1983) (Stone
“thought Butler was too soft in dealing with criminal
matters”).
180
See, e.g., Maltzman & Wahlbeck, 90 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. at 590-91 (ﬁnding that Justices were more likely to
move from a dissenting conference vote to the majority
than to defect from the conference majority); Brenner &
Dorff, 4 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS at
198 (ﬁnding that movement from conference minority to
ultimate majority is the most frequent type of vote

ﬂuidity); Brenner, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. at 389 (ﬁnding
that 68% of the cases in which there was vote ﬂuidity
resulted in an increase in the size of the majority);
Brenner, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. at 531, 534 (“justices are
more likely to switch from the minority or nonparticipation at the original vote to the majority position at the
ﬁnal vote than to shift in the opposite direction . . .
Clearly, some of the justices, once they have lost at the
original vote or failed to participate in that vote, are
willing to conform to the opinion of the court’s majority
and vote with them at the ﬁnal vote. Indeed, over threequarters of the vote changes moved in a consensus
direction.”)
181
Four of McReynolds’s seven acquiescences in
ultimately unanimous case were strong (Keppel Bros.,
Fox Film, U.S. v. Louisiana, Alford), while three were
weak (Cahoon, Algoma Lumber, Lefkowitz). Of Sutherland’s three such acquiescences, at least two (Fox Film,
U.S. v. Louisiana) were strong, while his acquiescence in
Blasius may have been either strong or weak, depending
upon which docket book one consults. Brandeis’s
acquiescence in U.S. v. Louisiana was technically
weak, though Butler’s conference notes suggest that he
was initially inclined to dissent. The docket books also
suggest that his acquiescence in LaFranca was of the
strong variety. Stone strongly acquiesced in LaFranca
but only weakly in Worthen. The acquiescences of
Holmes in LaFranca, Butler in Patton, and Cardozo in
Gebardi each were strong, while Van Devanter’s
acquiescence in Bryan was weak. Roberts’s docket
book also suggests that Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone may
have acquiesced in Cahoon, but Stone’s record does not
corroborate this.
182
McReynolds acquiesced strongly in Binford and
Educational Films, but weakly in Murdock. Brandeis
acquiesced strongly in Gebardi, Funk, and Hansen. Van
Devanter acquiesced strongly in Funk, as did Butler and
Sutherland in Limehouse, while Cardozo did so weakly in
Sorrells. Stone’s docket book suggests that Roberts may
have acquiesced strongly in Liggett, but this is
corroborated by neither the Butler nor the Roberts nor
the Cardozo docket books.
183
McReynolds did not participate in the conference
votes in Railway Clerks, Lowe, Chambers, or Cochran.
184
Saul Brenner, Ideological Voting on the Vinson
Court: A Comparison of Original & Final Votes on the
Merits, 22 POLITY 157, 163 (1989). An examination of
these cases also provides some indication of the
comparative success of the Justices in preparing opinions
that would attract colleagues who had dissented or passed
at conference. There were thirteen major cases that
became unanimous after a divided conference vote.
Hughes (Cahoon, Blasius, Worthen, Doyal) and Stone
(Keppel Bros., U.S. v. Louisiana, Alford, Gebardi) each
accounted for 30.7% of these cases. Butler (Petersen
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Baking, Lefkowitz) and Sutherland (LaFranca, Patton)
each accounted for 15.4%, and Cardozo (Algoma
Lumber) accounted for 7.7%. Neither Holmes, Van
Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, nor Roberts was
responsible for any of these decisions. This phenomenon
can also be examined by looking at the percentage of
unanimous opinions authored by a Justice that were not
unanimous at conference. Here Stone ranked ﬁrst at
100% (4/4), Butler (1/2) and Cardozo (2/4) second at
50%, Hughes third at 30.7% (4/13), and Sutherland
fourth at 28.6% (2/7). The remaining Justices were of
course tied at 0%. These data also should be viewed in
light of divided major decisions in which the author
failed to increase the size of the conference majority.
Neither Holmes, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Butler,
Stone, nor Cardozo authored any such decisions; but of
the thirteen such cases, Hughes was the author of 46.1%
(Blaisdell, Sgro, Stromberg, Near, Sorrells, Crowell),
Sutherland of 30.8% (Powell, McIntosh, Liebmann,
Bland), Roberts of 15.4% (Nebbia, Grau), and Brandeis
(O’Gorman) of 7.7%. One should also consider cases in
which the author of an opinion managed to attract
additional votes, but failed to achieve unanimity. Roberts
did so in four of twelve such cases (Murdock, Hansen v.
Haff, Liggett, Jackson); Sutherland did so in three (Funk,
Stephenson v. Binford, Rock Island); and Van Devanter
(Indian Motorcycle), McReynolds (Burnet), Brandeis
(Limehouse), Stone (Educational Films), and Cardozo
(Condon) in one each. Neither Holmes nor Butler
accounted for any such cases. These data also should be
read in light of the observation that, “[f]rom 1932 to
1937, Hughes . . . assigned 44 percent of the important
constitutional cases to Roberts and Sutherland . . . When
the liberal bloc dissented, Roberts, who was then a center
judge, was assigned 46 percent of the opinions. The
remaining 54 percent were divided among the conservatives,” with Sutherland taking 25%, Butler 18%,
and McReynolds 11%. “When the conservative bloc
dissented, Hughes divided 63 percent of those cases
between himself and Roberts.” Danelski, The Inﬂuence
of the Chief Justice, at 173-74.
185
See, e.g., Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court Docket
Books: The Late Terms, 1937-1940, 55 AM. J. LEG.
HIST. __ (forthcoming, December 2015). Other studies
have shown that neither Roberts nor Cardozo exhibited a
freshman effect with respect to bloc voting. See Dudley,
21 AM. POLITICS Q. at 364-65; Bowen & Scheb II, 15
POL. BEHAV. at 7, 11.
186
Freund, 26 OHIO ST. L. J. at 227.
187
Some studies of voting ﬂuidity conclude that
“justices were no more likely to change their votes in
important, or salient, cases than in those of lesser
importance.” Hagle & Spaeth, 44 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY at 124. See also Maltzman &
Wahlbeck, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. at 589 (ﬁnding that
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“justices are not less likely to switch in salient cases”);
Brenner, Hagle, & Spaeth, The Defection of the Marginal
Justice, 42 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 409
(concluding that the defection of the marginal member of
the minimum winning coalition on the Warren Court is
best explained not by the importance of the case, but
instead by that Justice’s ideological proximity to
members of the dissenting coalition and, secondarily,
to that Justice’s relative lack of competence). Other
studies conclude that acquiescence was in fact more
likely to occur in cases that were not “salient.” Dorff &
Brenner, 54 J. POLITICS at 772, 773; Brenner, Hagle, &
Spaeth, Increasing the Size, 23 POLITY 309. Compare
Brenner, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. at 530 (ﬁnding that the
percentage of total vote switches was no greater in
“nonmajor” than in “major” cases, but that vote switches
occurred in a higher percentage of “nonmajor” cases);
Brenner, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. at 389 (reaching similar
conclusions with a different data set).
188
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 198 (1964); MASON,
TAFT TO WARREN at 57; Alpheus Thomas Mason,
The Chief Justice of the United States: Primus Inter
Pares, 17 J. PUB. L. 20, 31-32 (1968).
189
Post, 85 MINN. L. REV. at 1309.
190
LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J.
SPAETH, & THOMAS WALKER, THE SUPREME
COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND
DEVELOPMENTS 147, 161 (1994).
191
Post, 85 MINN. L. REV. at 1310.
192
Post, 85 MINN. L. REV. at 1310-11, 1356; MASON,
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT at 198; William Howard
Taft to Harlan F. Stone, Jan. 26, 1927, Box 76, Harlan F.
Stone Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
quoted in WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF
JUDICIAL STRATEGY 47 (1964); Danelski, The
Inﬂuence of the Chief Justice, at 174.
193
2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 1049 (1939) (Taft
“shrank from all dissents, including his own”); Post, 85
MINN. L. REV. at 1311-12.
194
Urofsky, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. at 330; Post, 85
MINN. L. REV. at 1318, 1340, 1341, 1343.
195
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 214-15 (2d. ed. 1968); MURPHY at 52; Post, 85
MINN. L. REV. at 1340.
196
Post, 85 MINN. L. REV. at 1341-43.
197
Post, 85 MINN. L. REV. at 1341-44; James C.
McReynolds to Harlan F. Stone, Apr. 2, 1930, Box 76,
Harlan F. Stone Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, quoted in Corley, Steigerwalt, & Ward, 38 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. at 30; MURPHY at 52-53.
198
Urofsky, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. at 327, 328, 330; Post,
85 MINN. L. REV. at 1341-42, 1344-46, 1349-51;
MASON, TAFT TO WARREN at 58 (“For the sake of
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harmony staunch individualists such as Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, though disagreeing, would sometimes go
along with the majority”); Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“I think it useless and undesirable, as a rule,
to express dissent”); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE
BRANDEIS 18 (1957) (“‘Can’t always dissent,’
[Brandeis] said . . . ‘I sometimes endorse an opinion
with which I do not agree.’”)
199
Epstein, Segal, & Spaeth, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. at
365. See also O’Brien, Institutional Norms, at 98.
200
Danelski, The Inﬂuence of the Chief Justice, at 174;
O’Brien, Institutional Norms, at 98.
201
Danelski, The Inﬂuence of the Chief Justice, at
174.
202
In cases decided by written opinion, White dissented
in 1.35%, Taft in 0.93%, Hughes in 2.24%, Stone in
13.49%, Vinson in 12.44%, and Warren in 12.13%. S.
Sidney Ulmer, Exploring the Dissent Patterns of the
Chief Justices: John Marshall to Warren Burger, in
SHELDON GOLDMAN & CHARLES M. LAMB, eds.,
JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS: BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN APPELLATE
COURTS 53 (1986).
203
Post, 85 MINN. L. REV. at 1344.
204
Post, 85 MINN. L. REV. at 1344, 1348-49, 1354,
1356-57; Evan A. Evans, The Dissenting Opinion—Its
Use and Abuse, 3 MO. L. REV. 120, 123-26 (1938)
(quoting various criticisms of dissents made by members
of the bench and bar); Alex Simpson, Jr., Dissenting
Opinions, 71 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 205-06 (1923)
(quoting various professional criticisms of dissenting
opinions); William A. Bowen, Dissenting Opinions, 17
GREEN BAG 690, 693 (1905) (“the Dissenting Opinion
is of all judicial mistakes the most injurious”). See
also Ulmer, Exploring the Dissent Patterns, at 50–51
(“dissent diminishes the image of monolithic solidarity,
which allegedly enhances respect for the Court and
obedience to its mandates”).
205
ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 19 (1924), in
LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ABA JUDICIAL CODE 137 (1992). In 1972, the
American Bar Association replaced the Canons with a
Code of Judicial Conduct, which does not contain a

provision similar to Canon 19. Wahlbeck, Spriggs II, &
Maltzman, 27 AMERICAN POLITICS QUARTERLY
at 508 n.1.
206
Post, 85 MINN. L. REV. at 1284 n.55.
207
Post, 85 MINN. L. REV. at 1345. See also Caldeira &
Zorn, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. at 877; MURPHY at 61 (“A
Justice who persistently refuses to accommodate his
views to those of his colleagues may come to be regarded
as an obstructionist. A Justice whose dissents become
levers for legislative or administrative action reversing
judicial policies may come to be regarded as disloyal to
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